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THE KIDS ARE ALL RIGHT: THE LAW OF FREE
EXPRESSION AND NEW INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES
Mark Tushnet+
Recently the literature on free expression has turned to the question, should
the law of free expression be adjusted because of the availability of new
information technologies (hereafter NIT), and if so, how? The only thing about
NIT that distinguishes them from traditional media is that disseminating
expression via NIT is much less expensive than doing so via traditional media.
The tenor of recent scholarship on NIT and free expression is that the invention
of NIT does support some modification of free expression law. This Essay
argues that that conclusion might be correct, but that many of the arguments
offered in support move much too quickly. The Essay tries to slow them down
and in so doing to suggest that the arguments require complex and contestable
judgments about exactly how an expansion of expression might elicit new rules
regulating it. My goal is to identify the lines of analysis that need to be pursued
before we conclude that the existing law of free expression should be modified
in response to NIT. In that somewhat limited sense the Essay is contrarian.
The Essay’s overall theme is that the First Amendment rules in place probably
already accommodate the concerns that motivate arguments for adjusting the
law of free expression. The First Amendment, that is, is not obsolete.

+
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law emeritus, Harvard Law School. This Essay develops
ideas I sketched in a keynote speech to a conference on free expression sponsored by the
International Association of Constitutional Law in July 2020. I thank Rebecca Tushnet and
participants in the conference for their comments on prior versions (and note that most of the
comments were critical of the position I take here).
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INTRODUCTION
Recent literature on free expression has turned to the question: Should the law
of free expression be adjusted because of the availability of new information
technologies (hereafter “NIT”), and if so, how?1 As far as I can tell, the only
thing that distinguishes NIT from traditional media is that disseminating
expression via NIT is much less expensive than doing so via traditional media.2
1. For present purposes the term “new information technologies” refers to internet-based
methods of disseminating information, including Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, and WhatsApp. For
two recent contributions, see Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Free Speech and Democracy: A
Primer for 21st Century Reformers, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1631 (2021) (addressing the values of
the First Amendment—that more speech is always better than less—in a modern environment
flooded with potentially harmful speech); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in THE
PERILOUS PUBLIC SQUARE: STRUCTURAL THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION TODAY 15 (David E.
Pozen ed., 2020) (commenting on how NIT are likely to force free speech doctrines to grapple with
the need to promote a healthier market place of ideas). See also Massaro & Norton, supra note 1,
at 1638, n.13 (citing earlier versions of the argument).
2. See, e.g., Massaro & Norton, supra note 1, at 1639 (referring to “the cheapness of
speech”); Wu, supra note 1, at 16 (referring to the “low costs of speaking”). Other authors have
summarized the “unique” characteristics of NIT as velocity, virality, anonymity, homophily, and
monopoly. Nathaniel Persily, The Internet’s Challenge to Democracy: Framing the Problem and
Assessing Reforms, in ONLINE PLATFORMS AND LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES 2019: LEGAL AND
REGULATORY RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES 585, 5–6 (2019). That these are
“unique” or analytically separate from cheapness seems questionable to me. As to velocity and
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More precisely, the cost of disseminating a message to an intended audience is
much lower.3 The lower cost leads to more expression, which is said to make
greater demands upon the scarce resources of listeners’ attention.4
The tenor of recent scholarship on NIT and expression is that the invention of
NIT does support some modification of current free expression doctrine so as to
continue to advance the values protected and promoted by that doctrine. This
Essay argues that the conclusion might be correct but that many of the arguments
offered in support of it move much too quickly. The Essay tries to slow them
down—or, to use a different metaphor, to put more flesh on their bones—and in
so doing to suggest that the arguments require complex and contestable
judgments about exactly how an expansion of expression might elicit new rules
regulating it. The goal is to identify the lines of analysis that the literature should
pursue before concluding that the existing law of free expression should be
modified in response to NIT, though without tracking every twist and turn in
each line. In that somewhat limited sense, the Essay is contrarian.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Section I examines and critiques Professor
Tim Wu’s prominent version of the argument that the development of NIT
should lead us to rethink the law of free expression. Section II presents the
paradigm underlying free expression law: that speech causes harm. That
paradigm means that the law of free expression attempts to jointly optimize
speech and harm by keeping the harm caused by speech to an acceptable level
without eliminating that harm entirely. An increase in the amount of expression
might lead us to revise free expression law because—simplifying the argument
substantially—the more speech, the more harm, which might lead us to seek a
new set of rules that once again balance speech and harm.
Section III identifies two kinds of supporting arguments. First, it is said, NIT
should lead us to alter substantive First Amendment law and impose liability for
utterances that traditionally have received constitutional protection. The general

virality, consider the well-known saying, “[a] lie can travel halfway around the world while the
truth is putting on its shoes,” which regularly comes up in discussions of libel law. A Lie Can
Travel Halfway Around the World While the Truth is Putting on Its Shoes, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR
(July 13, 2013), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/07/13/truth/ (discussing the saying’s origins).
NIT scale up this familiar problem, and for that reason this Essay’s focus is on scale or amount of
expression. I discuss homophily in Section III and monopoly in Section V(A). NIT are contrasted
with categories of “traditional media,” including face-to-face interactions, pamphlets, newspapers,
movies, radio, and television, and combinations of these media such as videotapes and CDs.
3. Sometimes the effect is to disseminate the message to a wider audience than the speaker
cares to reach, but discussions of NIT tend to assume either that the speaker does not care that the
message will reach a group larger than its intended audience or that the speaker actually welcomes
that effect.
4. See, e.g., Massaro & Norton, supra note 1, at 1639 (asserting that “the [sheer] volume of
speech . . . now leaves listeners’ attention . . . increasingly scarce”); Wu, supra note 1, at 23
(referring to “scarcity of attention”). I address the “scarce attention” claim specifically in Section
I but thereafter refer only to the increased amount of speech via NIT; such references should be
read to incorporate scarce attention.
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balance we have struck among the values promoted by free expression has to be
reconsidered in light of NIT.
The second argument identified in Section III is that NIT is said to affect the
mechanisms by which specific categories of speech cause specific harms.
Section IV examines this argument by addressing specific doctrinal areas in a
more granular fashion. It looks at the mechanisms by which more speech might
render no longer socially optimal rules—what will be called the “rules in
place”—that jointly optimize speech and harm in a world with the traditional
media only. This Section also looks at false statements that injure reputation
(libel); expression that induces unlawful action (the subject of the traditional law
of sedition); sexually explicit expression (obscenity and pornography); false
statements that inflict no material harm (fake news); and threats (cyberstalking).
Section V turns to arguments about the platforms which make up NIT:
Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms. These arguments come in
several forms. First, the platforms should be subject to the same limitations on
speech regulation that apply to the government. Second, the platforms can be
regulated through the application of antitrust or fiduciary law without violating
the First Amendment. This Section discusses existing First Amendment
doctrine about the application of “general” laws to the media and examines some
issues that might arise in connection with tinkering with antitrust or fiduciary
law as the vehicle for platform regulation. Third, the platforms should be held
liable for the utterances they disseminate, holding constant the substantive rules
of libel, threats, and other torts involving intentional falsehoods. The overall
theme in Section V is that the First Amendment rules in place probably already
accommodate the concerns that motivate arguments for the three types of
platform regulation.
I. IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT OBSOLETE?: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Professor Tim Wu opens his essay, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, with
the observation that “[t]he most important change in the expressive environment
can be boiled down to one idea: it is no longer speech itself that is scarce, but
the attention of listeners. Emerging threats to public discourse take advantage
of this change.”5 Contemporary censorship “targets listeners or [] undermines
speakers indirectly” “[i]nstead of targeting speakers directly.”6 It does so
through both “new punishments, like unleashing ‘troll armies’ to abuse the press
and other critics, and” by “flooding tactics . . . that distort or drown out
disfavored speech.”7 Wu identifies “three developments” that combine to
change the information environment: (1) “the massive decrease since the 1990s
in the costs of being an online speaker”; (2) “the rise of ‘attention industry’ . . .
5. Wu, supra note 1, at 15.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 15, 24–25 (describing both “online harassment and attacks” and “distorting and
flooding” as “cheaper . . . alternatives” to “direct censorship”).
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actors whose business model is the resale of human attention”; and (3) “the rise
of the ‘filter bubble[,]’ . . . [meaning] the tendency of attention merchants . . .
[to] offer[] audiences a highly tailored, filtered package of information designed
to match their preexisting interests.”8
Wu offers a number of suggested new laws, the constitutionality of which
might require “doctrinal evolution”—referred to here as adjustment of the rules
in place.9 These include laws “designed to better combat the specific problem
of troll-army style attacks on journalists or other public figures; [and] [n]ew . . .
restrictions on the ability of major media and internet speech platforms to
knowingly accept money from foreign governments attempting to influence
American elections.”10
Notice first that the proposed law regarding foreign contributions would apply
to “major media” as well as internet speech platforms. Wu’s inclusion of the
major media suggests that the problem does not arise from NIT, although NIT
may have brought the problem to our attention. Further, it seems quite clear that
the proposed statute is constitutional under the rules in place, so no doctrinal
evolution is required.11
Professor Wu also suggests that we might have to expand the notion of
accomplice liability to deal with the troll armies that public officials can unleash.
He offers examples, such as: “the president . . . name[s] individual members of
the press and suggest[s] they should be punished, yielding a foreseeable attack;
[or] . . . the president . . . order[s] private individuals . . . to attack or punish
critics of the government.”12
The latter example appears to involve a troll army that is indistinguishable
from a real army: its members respond to “orders” from the president. It is
8. Id. at 21. It is worth noting that new technologies have regularly elicited concerns that
they change everything: yellow journalism compared to established professionalized or partisan
newspapers; William Randolph Hearst as a new kind of media monopolist influencing public
policy; or Father Charles Coughlin’s use of radio to promote demagogic policies, “I’m mad as hell”
from the movie “Network” regarding a televised version of talk radio. Each time it has turned out
that existing doctrine was reasonably good at dealing with the problems critics associated with these
phenomena.
9. Id. at 35.
10. Id. at 38.
11. The Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision upholding a statutory ban on
contributions by non-citizens to U.S. political campaigns. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281,
288 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). It has upheld the constitutionality of a statute
requiring domestic distributors of certain foreign-produced materials to label them as “political
propaganda.” Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 467, 484–85 (1987). And it has held that the First
Amendment does not cover the expressive activities of foreign nationals. Agency for Int’l Dev. v.
All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2086 (2020) (stating in a case involving free expression,
“it is long settled as a matter of American constitutional law that foreign citizens outside U. S.
territory do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution”). These cases make it clear that the
unadjusted rules in place would readily support the constitutionality of a ban on foreign interference
in U.S. elections via NIT.
12. Wu, supra note 1, at 36–37.
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doubtful that anyone would think that a president who ordered soldiers to beat
up critics because they were critics had not violated the First Amendment,
though there might be problems in devising an appropriate remedy for the
violation. Again, no adjustment in the rules in place seems required.
The same may be true of the president who suggests that named individuals
should be punished, which foreseeably occurs. First, note that the problem is
not new: it is presented by Henry II’s purported statement in 1170, referring to
Thomas Becket, “Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?”13 Second,
consider a milder variant: a hypothetical government-distributed list of works
that no patriotic citizen should purchase. This government action is
recognizably an act of censorship subject to ordinary First Amendment
scrutiny.14
Finally, it is not clear that accomplice liability for foreseeable unlawful
actions requires the person subject to liability to: (1) foresee that the unlawful
action will occur—a subjective standard—or; (2) allow punishment if the person
reasonably should have foreseen that it would occur—an objective standard—,
either in general or in the First Amendment context.15
The example of a troll paramilitary raises another concern. Suppose that the
president cannot order trolls to turn out. Rather, the soldiers in the troll
paramilitary are ordinary citizens who happen to agree with the president’s
disparaging remarks about journalists.16 As Geoffrey Stone observes in his
comment on Professor Wu’s essay, “[i]ndividuals who take positions that offend
others . . . have always been vulnerable to condemnation by others, and such
personal condemnation by neighbors, friends, employers, and coworkers might
be far more daunting that mass condemnation by strangers, especially once
people get used to such behavior. And, yet, we lived with it,” at least where the
condemnation does not come in the form of a true threat.17 Again, the problem
is not new. The only question is whether this sort of condemnation occurs should
13. For a discussion of the phrase’s genesis, see Emily Guerry, “Will No One Rid Me of This
Meddlesome Priest?”: The Truth Behind Henry II’s Notorious Lament, HISTORY EXTRA, Apr. 20,
2021, available at https://www.historyextra.com/period/medieval/will-no-one-rid-me-of-thismeddlesome-priest-truth-henry-ii-quote/.
14. We might think that the rules in place do not strike the right balance because we should
put up with more harm than the rules in place allow. On some accounts that invoke institutional
limitations on legislative and judicial competence, individuals may think that the socially
acceptable level of harm is higher than that generated by the rules in place. If so, the increased
injury wrought by NIT might lead us to protect more expression to maintain the same (inadequate)
level of damage.
15. For further discussion regarding accomplice liability, see infra Section V(C).
16. At one point Professor Wu describes the troll armies as “the government’s allies.” Wu,
supra note 1, at 27 (emphasis omitted). This is a weaker formulation than the earlier one in which
the troll armies took orders from the president, but it raises the same issues about the choice between
a subjective and an objective standard of foreseeability for purposes of accomplice liability.
17. Geoffrey Stone, Reflections on Whether the First Amendment is Obsolete, in THE
PERILOUS PUBLIC SQUARE, STRUCTURAL THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION TODAY 44, 46–47
(David E. Pozen, ed., 2020).
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lead us to adjust the rules in place. This question is discussed in Section V(E)
below.
A more pervasive concern is that Professor Wu has too narrow a conception
of what regulations fall within the First Amendment’s domain. His paradigm
example is an action that “directly punish[es] disfavored speakers” or “coercive
government action”—in essence, locking critics up or fining them.18 This theory
is why he treats the acts of troll armies as a new form of punishment and grounds
his suggestion that “the First Amendment must broaden its own reach to
encompass new techniques of speech control.”19 This is an inadequate
description of the First Amendment’s domain. Government actions that increase
the cost of operating an expressive business are subject to First Amendment
scrutiny. Taxes imposed on the press are an obvious example, and not because
failure to pay the tax might be punished coercively.20 Similarly, with the list of
disapproved publications. Once we see that the punishments Professor Wu
describes as new are actually well-established objects of First Amendment
concern, we might reevaluate his claim that the “new” punishments require an
adjustment of the rules in place. These new punishments might or might not
require an adjustment, depending on what the relevant rule is, but that calls for
a more discrete analysis than Professor Wu offers.
Finally, what of the flooding of listeners’ attention? Here Professor Wu’s
analysis is incomplete. Start with traditional media. Users have strategies for
consuming them. For newspapers, one person’s strategy might be to skip the
business section, skim the international news, and read stories about baseball but
skip stories about hockey. For radio, a strategy might be to listen to one channel
until you hear the weather report, then switch to an all-news channel for the
headlines, then turn to a talk radio channel. Another example might be a
newspaper reader who chooses to read the Washington Post rather than the
Washington Examiner. User strategies reinforce and perhaps intensify the
reader’s preexisting views. Professor Wu does not discuss why such strategies
are unavailable to users of NIT.21
18. Wu, supra note 1, at 31, 34.
19. Id. at 32.
20. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star Tribune, Inc. v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 575, 591–92 (1983)
(holding unconstitutional a state tax on the paper and ink used by large-circulation newspapers).
21. Some NIT business models try to keep users on their sites for as long as possible, and
certainly have the potential to do so longer than traditional media do: A reader can actually finish
a newspaper, but you cannot finish YouTube. You can, however, get tired of clicking on seemingly
enticing new offerings—and can devise general strategies for avoiding chasing every new rabbit
that the site runs across your screen.
I can report only my own experience as a relatively light user of NIT who accepts default
privacy settings. I find it a little creepy that shortly after I do a Google search for some product I
start getting ads for products in the same or a related category, but I do not have any difficulty
skipping them. When bored, I sometimes click on obvious click-bait postings, but can ignore them
in the ordinary course. And I undoubtedly have other strategies that operate below the level of
consciousness.
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As mentioned, Professor Wu refers to “attention merchants” who present
information “tailored” to the listeners’ “preexisting interests.”22 Why this is a
problem is unclear. If the tailoring is perfect, the material delivered cannot
distort the listeners’ views; it can only reinforce and perhaps even intensify
them. These effects are not distinctive to material delivered via NIT.23 Social
psychologists call this confirmation bias, and they have studied it for
generations, starting well before the arrival of NIT. If the tailoring is imperfect,
the material might change the contents of the basket of information users have,
but the information merchants’ business model will not work well if they try to
replace a large portion of the basket with something completely different.
I share Professor Wu’s sense that “filter bubbles” are more common today
than in the past and that they are more difficult to burst.24 I am not sure that we
are correct in our assessment, though, because we do not have good historical
studies of, for example, whether the readers of the intensely partisan newspapers
of the nineteenth century lived in filter bubbles too. Even if we are correct, it is
not clear that epistemic closure results from NIT rather than from political
developments. For example, political polarization drives epistemic closure,
which NIT then reinforces through filter bubbles—rather than filter bubbles
driving political polarization.25
In Professor Wu’s work, and in the literature of which it is a part of its own
epistemic bubble, assumptions about both existing law and the distinctively
harmful effects of expression via NIT go unquestioned. The remainder of this
Essay examines many of those assumptions, sometimes finding them warranted
and other times finding them more problematic.
II. THE SPEECH-CAUSES-HARM PARADIGM AND NIT
Why should an expansion of expression lead us to reconsider the shape of free
expression doctrine? The proposition that lies at the heart of free expression law
is that speech causes harm.26 Many of the arguments for adjusting free
22. Wu, supra note 1, at 21.
23. For example, we know that political radicalization has occurred through the dissemination
of videotapes, CDs, and through face-to-face discussions (“brain-washing”) when groups recruit
new members by isolating them from outside contact.
24. Wu, supra note 1, at 21–23.
25. Without claiming that social scientists have pinned down how and particularly when the
polarization we are experiencing began, some prominent works date it from the 1980s and early
1990s, before NIT became pervasive. See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT’S
EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH
THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 31, 44–45, 49 (2012); JULIAN E. ZELIZER, BURNING DOWN
THE HOUSE: NEWT GINGRICH, THE FALL OF A SPEAKER, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW REPUBLICAN
PARTY 285, 300 (2020).
26. Frederick Schauer has insisted on this proposition throughout his scholarship on the law
of free expression. For a recent version, see Frederick Schauer, Rights, Constitutions, and the Perils
of Panglossianism, 38 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 635, 647–48 (2018). See also Mark Tushnet,
ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO FREEDOM EXPRESSION § 1.3 (2018).
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expression law in light of NIT take for granted that because more speech causes
more harm, an increase in expression could readily justify changing the preexisting law.27 In its barebones form, that assumption is mistaken. Adding flesh
on the bones, however, turns out to be a complex enterprise.
Free expression doctrine seeks to achieve the level of regulation that jointly
optimizes or, in less formal terms, strikes the right balance between expression
and harm.28 The doctrine asserts that the harm caused by constitutionally
protected expression is acceptable within the relevant society and that rules
protecting expression that causes less harm would be unacceptable, as would the
imposition of liability on expression that causes more harm.29 As a result, the
rules in place today, having been developed with traditional media in mind,
protect expression that causes an acceptable level or distribution of harm.30 If
speech causes harm, then the more speech there is the more harm there is and
the distribution of that added harm might be troubling. Applying the current
rules in a world where there is more expression, and in turn, more harm or a
problematically different distribution of harm can produce a greater-thanacceptable level or distribution of harm. The argument for changing the rules in
place for an NIT world is that some alternative rules can be devised that would
reproduce the acceptable level and distribution of harm.31 NIT means more
expression; more expression means more harm. The rules in place are
predicated on jointly optimizing expression and harm and may not continue to
do so in the NIT world.32
27. As Geoffrey Stone observes in his comment on Wu, “there was a time in our history when
technological advances in the communications market caused similar angst,” referring to the
development of radio broadcasting. Stone, supra note 17, at 46. Because the rules in place at the
time imposed few limits on government regulation of expression, they did not need to be adjusted
to deal with the then-new technology. Over time the rules applicable to broadcasting have come
into line with those applicable to the media that pre-existed radio. Perhaps we should take the
overall story about regulating radio as a new technology that gradually became a familiar one as a
cautionary tale.
28. Another way of stating this, is that the rules in place identify the point on the Pareto
frontier for speech and harm that the society finds acceptable. (In the present context the Pareto
frontier is the set of combinations of speech and harm with the characteristic that increasing one
element, such as speech, necessarily decreases the other.)
29. Social acceptability includes consideration of the way in which harm is distributed among
the population.
30. “Acceptability” is a social judgment, and one nation’s legal and social culture at one point
in time might find acceptable a doctrinal structure that another nation’s culture would find
unacceptable, or that the same nation’s culture would find unacceptable at another point in time.
31. Again, an alternative rule, or rules, would return us to the point on the Pareto frontier that
we, as a society, had previously concluded was where we wanted to be. In this Essay, my shorthand
formulations generally refer only to level of harm, but the full formulation would need to take into
consideration the distribution of harm.
32. Embedded in this argument is the assumption that the existence of NIT has not changed
what the relevant society regards as an acceptable level of harm. Specifically, the existence of NIT
is not in itself a reason for increasing or decreasing the socially tolerable amount of harm caused
by expression. In the end, we might be unable to devise administrable new rules that keep the harm
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So far, the assumption is that more expression means more harm or harm
distributed differently. However, it also means more of whatever it is that makes
expression socially valuable. The increased social value of increased expression
might offset the increased harm or the changed distribution of harm, in which
case the rule in place might still optimize expression and harm. Suppose that a
lawmaker reasonably concludes that increases in the amount of expression have
diminishing marginal value, with each new expression increasing social value
but less than the previous increase, and that each new expression increases harm
by the same amount. For example, there might be some social value in
disseminating lies, but the more a lie is repeated, the less each repetition adds to
society. Yet, each additional lie might undermine public confidence in the
accuracy of all statements the public encounters as much as the first or
subsequent lie did. The rule in place might then not optimize expression and
harm. This possibility lies at the heart of what follows.
The remainder of this Essay examines two ways that the rules in place might
be altered.33 First, NITs might lead us to change doctrine by changing our
understanding of the proper balance among the values underlying the rules in
place. The second way is by identifying how more speech causes more harm
with respect to specific categories of expression. The next Sections of this Essay
deal with those methods in succession. However, this Essay focuses on how the
structures of free expression doctrine are created, not on what the new rules for
NIT should be—it is methodological rather than prescriptive.34
Embedded within the argument that NIT should affect the law of free
expression because NIT increases the harm caused by speech is a question about
the structure of the new law of free expression. Should the traditional media
continue to be regulated by the rules in place and new rules be developed that
are applicable only to NIT? Alternatively, should the new rules be applied to
both traditional media and NIT? We can imagine a doctrinal structure where the
law responds to the incremental harm caused by each medium: one rule for
expression disseminated face-to-face, another for expression over radio, and yet

caused by free expression to the level the rules in place do for expression via traditional media. In
that case, we would have to accept a new, higher level of harm. I suspect that this constraint might
not exist in connection with all expression disseminated via NIT but might exist in connection with
some discrete categories of expression. I take a category-by-category approach to the larger
question in what follows but do not examine in detail the question of whether we can devise an
administrable new rule for NIT with respect to each category.
33. The focus of this Essay is on the structure of the substantive law of free expression. I do
not address even broader questions about the political economy of expression in a world with NIT,
because the connection between political economy and specific doctrinal formulations is essentially
indeterminate (both for the world in which there were only the traditional media and for today’s
world). See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 10 (2019) (examining such questions).
34. However, I do sometimes suggest how a rule-structure that features a general preference
for proportionality arguments might respond to NIT differently than the way in which more
categorical rule-structure, such as that used in the United States, might respond.
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a third for expression through NIT. The logic is clear. Each medium adds
further harms on the margin, compared to a baseline set perhaps by face-to-face
communication, and joint optimization is best achieved by addressing each
medium’s incremental contribution to harm.
In Section V of this essay, the inquiry is framed in those terms. For example,
it asks whether we would penalize a large-circulation newspaper for publishing
a story that we would treat as constitutionally protected when published by a
small-circulation one. As a matter of the positive law of free expression in the
United States and elsewhere, the rules are the same for all traditional media. The
reason is likely administrability: defining rules calibrated according to a
medium’s incremental effect on harm is probably beyond the capacity of courts
devising constitutional doctrine.35
III. NIT AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREE EXPRESSION LAW
A catalog of values defines the contours of freedom of expression: personal
autonomy, discovery of truth, promoting the functioning of democracy,
suspicion of government’s ability to determine the socially acceptable level and
distribution of harm, social order, privacy, and equality.36 These values help us
identify the precise contours of the constitutional rules we think will jointly
optimize expression and harm.
NIT might make some of these values more vivid. The increased amount of
expression might clarify for us the fact that false statements that affect reputation
can thereby trench upon privacy interests.37 The proliferation of sexually
explicit material over the Internet might make it clearer that such expression has
adverse effects upon women’s social standing. We might reconsider the
proposition that the rules in place jointly optimize expression and harm.38
35. The issue of administrability surfaces in discussions of whether “citizen journalists” or
bloggers fall within mostly statutory protections afforded to “real” journalists. See IAN CRAM,
CITIZEN JOURNALISTS: NEWER MEDIA, REPUBLICAN MOMENTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 119–43
(2015), for a discussion of how several jurisdictions address this question.
36. How equality is built into the doctrine implicates aspects of the state action doctrine that
I do not address in this essay. A shorthand version of the state action issue is this: Expression might
contribute to inequality by inducing private parties to devalue a class of people—in the usual
example, women—even when that devaluation is not independently unlawful. The rules in place
can of course be evaluated with reference to their contribution to inequality, but that is only to say
that equality concerns are built into the rules in place. My concern is with the effect NIT should
have on doctrine, taking as constant whatever array of values has shaped the rules in place.
37. The classic example is Sidis v. F.R. Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (an
action for invasion of privacy involving a magazine story depicting the plaintiff, who had been
celebrated decades earlier as a child prodigy, as an eccentric, which harmed his reputation as well).
38. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 1, at 1654–83 (discussing this as a primary theme).
See also Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1959–60 (2018); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating
First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119–20 (2018) (discussing similar accounts). This
reconsideration leads us to conclude that the rules in place were not on the Pareto frontier in the
first place.

482

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:471

The conclusion of this argument, strikingly, is that the rules in place do not
actually jointly optimize even in connection with the traditional media. Indeed,
my strong impression is that advocates for new rules in light of NIT favored
those rules before NIT became prominent, the most obvious example being
advocates for the feminist argument for greater regulation of sexually explicit
material.39
I stress that there is nothing wrong or even troubling about this kind of claim.
Increasing the clarity with which we see how values are implicated by specific
rules is a good thing, and if the rise of NIT generates clarity, all the better. It is
just that the new rules, displacing the old ones, are not designed with any special
characteristics of NIT in mind. The proposition that more harm is occurring is
not built into the new rules in any way. That’s not true of the second way that
NIT might lead us to change the rules in place.
IV. HOW MORE SPEECH CAUSES MORE HARM, AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE
ABOUT IT
This Section examines several specific doctrinal areas and asks, how is more
harm produced or distributed differently when this particular type of expression
is disseminated through NIT rather than through the traditional media? If the
rules in place strike the right balance between expression and harm, given the
amount and distribution of harm that occurs when traditional media are used,
they do so by affording constitutional protection to expression in terms set by
the rules in place. NIT change the level and sometimes the distribution of harm,
but we can maintain the same level and distribution of harm by protecting less
expression than do the rules in place.40
A. The Implications of a Proportionality Rule in Place
Approaching the issue through the examination of selected doctrinal areas
requires some defense. The reason is that doing so might seem unacceptably
“categorical” to adherents of proportionality-based approaches to defining the
constitutionally permissible limits of regulation.41 Such approaches are
common and perhaps even are predominant outside the United States.42
Balancing approaches that used to be favored in the United States and that some
39. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1996).
40. We might think that the rules in place do not strike the right balance because we should
put up with more harm than the rules in place allow. On some accounts that invoke institutional
limitations on legislative and judicial competence, we actually think that the socially acceptable
level of harm is higher than that generated by the rules in place. If so, the increased harm wrought
by NIT might lead us to protect more expression so as to maintain the same, inadequate, level of
harm.
41. For a prominent recent work advocating for such an approach, see JAMAL GREENE, HOW
RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH RIGHTS IS TEARING AMERICA APART (2021).
42. For an overview of the doctrine and its use in many jurisdictions, see AHARON BARAK,
PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012).
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scholars continue to use are a form of proportionality as well.43 Modern forms
of proportionality review ask whether the legislature could reasonably believe
that the regulation in question advanced some government interest other than
mere suppression of expression, whether there were alternative responses to the
utterance that would advance the government interest almost as effectively, and
whether the impairment of free expression was proportionate to the harm the
utterance caused.44
The large literature on proportionality suggests rather strongly that no one is
advocating in favor of a case-specific proportionality rule.45 Rather, they ask
whether regulation of some category of expressions—such as hate speech or the
Holocaust lie that Nazi Germany did not have a program aimed at the
extermination of Europe’s Jews—satisfies a structured proportionality test.46
Put slightly differently, rather than examining proportionality with respect to a
specific utterance, they examine the proportionality of regulation applied to
categories of expression. These are categorical proportionality rules.
Now consider the effect of increasing the amount of expression subject to a
categorical proportionality rule. It is easy enough to apply such a rule to
expression via NIT: just plug the amount of harm into the final step and see
whether the regulation is proportionate. One might find, for example, that false
statements that injure reputation cause too little harm to justify the infringement
of free expression when they are distributed in small newspapers and that the
same statements distributed more widely multiply the harm sufficient to justify
the infringement. Here, the same rule is applied—structured proportionality

43. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
44. The literature on proportionality in comparative constitutional law is quite large.
See, e.g., VICKI JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS, NEW
CHALLENGES 1–2 (2017); GRANT HUSCROFT, BRADLEY W. MILLER, & GRÉGOIRE WEBBER,
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 1, 10–11, 16
(2014); AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
1–2, 5 (2012).
45. The reason comes through in considering a standard example drawn from the German
case law. The Basic Law recognizes a right to free development of the personality. A litigant
claimed that this gave him the right to feed pigeons in a public square, contrary to a local ordinance.
BVerfGE 54, 143. The court held that the right to development of personality was indeed infringed,
but that the infringement was justified when the court applied the proportionality test. Now
consider several variants. In one, the claimant is a socially isolated elderly person with few material
resources whose sole pleasure in life comes from feeding the pigeons, while in another, the claimant
is a well-to-do retired banker who simply enjoys feeding the pigeons. Social connectedness and
wealth might well play some role in the proportionality inquiry. Contrast those cases with one in
which the claimant wants to feed squirrels rather than pigeons. I doubt that proponents of
proportionality review would contend that the animal species should play any role at all. The reason
is that social connectedness and wealth are categorically relevant to the inquiry, whereas species
membership is categorically not relevant.
46. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE
L.J. 3094, 3111 n.79 (2015) (citing cases).
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with respect to this category of statements—but produces different results for
NIT.
We should pause here, though. The form of the argument is that application
of the relevant proportionality rule should be sensitive to the amount of harm
disseminating the statement causes and that that amount depends upon the
medium through which the statement is transmitted. As the example just given
suggests, that argument could (depending upon facts about different media)
support different outcomes when a libelous statement is distributed by a smallcirculation newspaper, a large-circulation one, radio, television, or another type
of available media. Thus, I argue in connection with libel, nothing intrinsic to
the structured proportionality approach rules out doing just that.47
What is more problematic is the thought that an utterance disseminated
through any of the traditional media can be constitutionally protected but that
the same utterance could be permissibly regulated when disseminated through
NIT. What would it take to show, for example, that regulation of fake news
distributed in radio broadcasts was disproportionate while the regulation of fake
news distributed via NIT was proportionate? The answer, it seems, would have
to be that the amount of harm in the latter case was large enough to tip the
balance at the final stage of the proportionality inquiry. Add up all the harm
caused by fake news distributed through the traditional media, and the
regulation’s infringement of free expression is too great, but add up all the harm
caused by fake news over NIT, and its greater volume justifies the regulation’s
infringement. And that could be so even if the infringement in the NIT case was
greater than that in the case of the traditional media if the increment of harm in
the NIT case was disproportionate to the increment of infringement.
All this might be so, but it is unlikely that the facts will fall out in just the right
way. In particular, I am skeptical that structured proportionality would draw a
line between NIT and all traditional media rather than, for example, drawing the
line between large-audience media—including some newspapers, and radio and
television under some circumstances—and small-audience media. If that is
correct, the effect of NIT is not to change the applicable rules, but, as discussed
in Section IV above, to clarify the way the categorical proportionality rule in
place should be applied.
So far, I have considered whether the increased amount of harm caused by
expression via NIT could support a different rule for NIT and the traditional
media. As others have observed, NIT makes new countermeasures available.
As we will see, in several doctrinal areas, the ease with which a person or
institution harmed by speech can counter that speech matters. Proportionality
approaches explain why: Countermeasures are among the alternatives to
regulation. In some settings, relying on the traditional media as the mechanism

47. Indeed, we can extract hints of such an approach from some libel and sedition cases. See
infra Sections IV(B)–(C). I think it possible that we could do the same in other doctrinal areas,
though I do not explore that possibility.
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of response might be notably less effective than regulation, but in those same
settings using NIT as a mechanism of response would be almost as effective as
regulation.48 Now the details.49
B. False Statements That Injure Reputation
Simply increasing the harm caused by false statements that injure reputation
should not affect the damages rule once we know that the statement is not
constitutionally protected. Suppose the liability rule is that actual damages can
be awarded for false statements about public figures made with knowledge of
their falsehood or with deliberate indifference to their truth or falsity—the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan liability rule.50 The more widely such a statement is
distributed, the greater the harm, and publication via NIT means that the
statement will indeed be more widely distributed.
That argument is correct, but it looks at the problem in the wrong way. We
should be concerned with whether NIT should lead us to reconsider the liability
rule.
Specifically, suppose a false statement injuring reputation is
constitutionally protected when published in a newspaper because, for example,
the plaintiff cannot show deliberate indifference. We should ask whether that
same statement could lose its protection if disseminated via NIT. The answer, I
believe, could be yes.
To see why we must ask why any false statement injuring reputation has
constitutional protection. As Justice Powell famously observed, false statements
injuring reputation have no social value in themselves.51 We protect them
nonetheless, out of a concern that imposing liability for false statements full stop
would deter publishers from making some true statements out of concern that
the institutions used to determine truth or falsity are imperfect. They sometimes
may find false a statement that is actually true.52 Publishers will then steer clear
of the forbidden zone, as Justice Brennan put it.53 The solution lies in devising
a liability rule that produces the socially desirable amount of truthful statements
and the socially acceptable level of harm to reputation.
Now consider how a person contemplating becoming a voluntary public
figure would think: I know that I will be exposed to the risk that my reputation

48. For a discussion of this possibility, see infra Section IV(E).
49. The following subsections present the rationales for the rules in place dogmatically,
without considering the merits of those rationales. Instead, I provide other scholarly references that
support the dogmatic statements.
50. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
51. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
52. Note that publishers are indifferent about the possibility that the decision-makers will
mistakenly determine that a false statement is actually true because such a finding would let them
off the hook entirely.
53. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). This is the mechanism of the well-known
chilling effect. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
Chilling Effect, 58 BOS. U. L. REV. 685, 688–89 (1978) (providing a detailed analysis).
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will be injured by false statements, but the benefits I’ll get from being a public
figure outweigh those risks. The liability rule in place is set by a judgment that
it gets us enough people willing to be public figures.54 Now increase the amount
of injury to which the potential public figure is exposed. Someone who would
choose to become a public figure given some risk of harm to reputation might
choose not to if the risk of harm increases.55 And, in turn, that means that the
pool of potential public figures shrinks below the level we thought we needed.
To bring it back to that level, we have to adjust the liability rule so that some
statements that were protected under the liability rule in place are not protected
under the new rule.
It is obvious how NIT fit into this picture. They increase the amount of harm,
and under the liability rule in place, more people will choose not to become
public figures. We must adjust the liability rule to keep the pool of potential
public figures where we want it to be.
As noted earlier, we could do that in one of several ways. We could retain the
liability rule in place for libelous statements distributed through traditional
media but create a looser rule for libelous statements distributed via NIT. Or we
could change the rule to the looser one and apply it to all media.
One suggestion that rattles around in the literature on libel and in the
comparative case law hints at the possibility of something like the first
approach—one that differentiates between NIT and the traditional media. That
suggestion has one primary component and one secondary component. The
primary component is that libelous statements should be constitutionally
protected only if they were made after conforming to the standards of
responsible journalism.56 The secondary component is that those standards
differ depending on circumstances. The obvious example is that responsible
journalism might require more extended inquiries for stories that the journalist
works on for a long time than are possible in connection with breaking news. In
one celebrated case, the court considered how much effort a responsible
journalist would expend in trying to get a comment from the libeled person.57
This second component might support different rules for small-circulation
publications and large-circulation ones or for citizen journalists and professional
reporters. In the second of each pair, the available resources might be larger,
and so responsible journalism might require more effort. Adapting this

54. This is the specific form that the question of joint optimization takes here.
55. It is easier to see this phenomenon if we think about people deciding whether to run for
public office and become public figures, but I think the logic operates in the same way when people
decide to embark upon careers that lead them to become celebrities or, as in one important case,
football coaches. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In traditional law-andeconomics terms, this is the effect a rule has on the activity level.
56. See Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, 642 (Can.) (adopting a defense “that
would allow publishers to escape liability if they can establish that they acted responsibly in
attempting to verify the information on a matter of public interest”).
57. Jameel v. Wall St. J. [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359, [53], [54], [58] (HL).
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argument to our context, we might then end up with one liability rule for libelous
statements in the traditional media and another for the same statements made via
NIT.
C. Expression that Induces Law Violation
The classic law of sedition involves prosecution for statements criticizing
existing government policy, typically where the policy is not itself
unconstitutional.58 The prosecutions do not rest on the proposition that criticism
is unlawful in itself. Rather, the government claims that criticism of its lawful
policies increases the risk that someone will act unlawfully, interfere with the
military draft, or engage in violent actions aimed at overthrowing the
government that generated the policy being criticized.59
Criticism has these effects because it can lead listeners to conclude, on their
own, that something should be done about the policy other than seeking its repeal
by lawful means, as compared with seditious speech that persuades listeners to
act. Criticism can take varying forms: Speakers can drily offer reasons for
rejecting the policy, package those reasons in rhetorical forms that make them
more effective, and urge listeners to do what they can to undermine the policy.
This is further complicated because there is inevitably a temporal gap between
the speaker’s utterance and the listeners’ unlawful action. That generates the
principle that the remedy for bad speech is more speech.60 That is, the speaker
offers reasons for rejecting the policy by acting unlawfully. The government
and its supporters can prevent the unlawful action by offering their own reasons
for the policy or for attempting to change the policy by repealing it.
The law of free expression recognizes that sometimes the temporal gap is too
small for counter-speech to be effective. The time between the speech and the
action might be quite short, as in a variant of the well-known case of Hess v.
Indiana.61 A speaker before an angry crowd says, “[w]e’ll take the fucking street
again.”62 Under the circumstances, the possibility that counter-speech will be
effective is tiny. The gap can be small in another sense. The speaker’s rhetoric
may be so powerful that it blocks the effectiveness of counter-speech even when
there is a larger temporal gap between the speech and the ensuing action.

58. See, e.g., Debs v.United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding a conviction for
obstructing the military draft by giving a speech vividly asserting that the draft was unjust).
59. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding a conviction for
obstructing the draft, arguing that the defendant’s speech encouraged listeners to resist the draft);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding convictions for conspiring to overthrow
the United States government by force and violence).
60. In the proportionality analyses, counter speech is one of the available alternatives to
regulation.
61. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (quoting Hess v. State, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415
(Ind. 1973)).
62. The statement in Hess was, “‘[w]e’ll take the fucking street later,’ or ‘[w]e’ll take the
fucking street again.’” Id. at 107.
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Finally, the law of free expression can focus on personal responsibility.
Listeners who actually violate the substantive law can, of course, be prosecuted
for doing so without giving any consideration to whether punishing the speech
would be constitutional.
These considerations generate the rules in place dealing with liability for
disseminating words that cause unlawful action or, more precisely, that increase
the risk that unlawful action will occur. Those rules say something about how
large the temporal gap is—“clear and present” in some formulations,
“imminent” in others—the words’ rhetorical form—“incitement” or “mere
criticism,” for example—and the preference for imposing liability on those who
violate the substantive law.63 My concern here is not with what the right rule in
place should be. Instead, it is whether the increase in expression occasioned by
the development of NIT should change whatever the rule in place is.
It is difficult to see how that increase might affect the way in which the rules
address either the temporal gap or the question of rhetorical effect. Expression
via NIT is almost certainly as far removed in time from the listeners’ unlawful
action as it is in many traditional-media cases.64 Any rule that effectively deals
with the temporal gap for expression via the traditional media would likely work
for expression via NIT. Nor does it seem likely that the rhetorical effects differ
much. It is difficult to see how a statement broadcast over the radio would be
less effective than one distributed via NIT. The non-cognitive effects associated
with the traditional media, which might include things like the cinematographic
effects in Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, have their counterparts in
NIT.65 There are not any obvious reasons to think that the response of the rules

63. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (applying a “clear and present danger”
test); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (applying a test requiring imminence and
incitement). There are well-known problems with essentially every formulation of the candidate
rules in place: the clever inciter (Marc Antony at Caesar’s funeral is the usual example, as in Susan
Benesch, Inciting Genocide, Pleading Free Speech, 21 WORLD POLICY J. 62, 67 (2004)), the
sophisticated publisher whose arguments sway a simple-minded soldier (Abraham Lincoln’s
concern, in a letter to Erastus Corning, June 12, 1863, available at http://www.abrahamlincoln
online.org/lincoln/speeches/corning.htm), or the speaker who offers dry reasons in a setting where
listeners are likely to act unlawfully quite quickly (John Stuart Mill’s example of the speaker who
tells an excited crowd that corn dealers are oppressors of the poor, in JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY, ch. 3 (1859)). The law of free expression is best understood as holding that these
problems are worth tolerating because the rule in place optimizes speech and harm even if the clever
inciter, the publisher, or the dry speaker escape liability that in principle they should bear. The
thought is that any rule that captured these anomalous cases would be suboptimal because of the
alternative rule’s effects on more standard cases.
64. Massaro and Norton assert, “Time for counterspeech is now vanishingly small.” Massaro
& Norton, supra note 1, at 1645. They have in mind speech such as threats, which cause harm
immediately upon receipt, rather than speech that increases the risk of law-breaking. Id. Yet, there
is no time for counterspeech when true threats are made via traditional media.
65. For a description of these effects, see “Hand-Held History,” The Economist, Sept. 3, 2003
(obituary).

Summer 2022]

The Kids Are All Rigth

489

in place to such rhetorical effects in the traditional media would be less adequate
for NIT.
What the increase in expression might do, though, is increase the audience.
More people might “hear” expression via NIT than hear it through in-person
speeches, newspapers, or television. For ease of exposition, I will assume that
a specific expression we are concerned with leads a constant percentage of the
audience to break the law.66 Even if that percentage is quite small, increasing
the audience would increase the number of unlawful acts.
And that matters for the joint optimization calculation, taking into account the
preference for imposing liability on the law-breakers when possible. The
thought is this: where some expression induces only a handful of people to break
the law, and sufficient enforcement resources can be devoted to prosecuting lawbreakers to push down the harm actually inflicted. Liability is imposed on the
speaker as a backup to push that level down to where society wants it to be. As
the number of law-breakers increases, the enforcement resources devoted to
catching them might increase. At some point, though, enough resources cannot
be devoted to enforcement against the law-breakers to push the level down as
much without affecting the ability to do other things, which include enforcing
other laws, providing education, providing medical care, and so on through the
public budget.67
The conclusion then is obvious. To maintain the jointly optimized level, it
should be easier to hold liable speakers who send their messages via NIT. This
might be a reason for having two rules, one that makes it difficult to hold
someone liable for expression disseminated via traditional media and one that
makes it easier to do so where exactly the same message is disseminated via
NIT.68
D. Sexually Explicit Material
In the pre-Internet world, a person who wanted access to pornography or
obscenity would have to go somewhere to get it, such as an adult bookstore, a
theater showing pornographic films, or a store selling or renting videotapes and
CDs. Today, that same material is available at home and on-demand. Producing
sexually explicit material for distribution via the Internet is so much cheaper
66. I cannot think of a reason why dissemination via NIT would decrease the percentage of
listeners who are induced to break the law, though I cannot rule out the possibility that someone
with more imagination than I could come up with some such reason.
67. With some effort, we can find hints of this thought in Justice Holmes’s reference to the
“puny anonymities” in Abrams v. United States, whose speech he would have held free from
punishment. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629, 631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In
contrast to his willingness to uphold the conviction of Eugene V. Debs, a prominent political figure
and eloquent speaker. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
68. To use the example of U.S. law, the United States might continue to use the strict
Brandenburg “incitement to imminent lawless action” test for expression via the traditional media
but revert to a looser “clear and present danger” test for expression via NIT. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). Cf. id. at 449 (Black, J., concurring).
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than producing films that an extremely large supply of amateur pornography is
now available.69 NIT, in short, rather clearly did increase the amount of sexually
explicit material available to consumers. If such material causes harm, as those
who wish to regulate it believe, NIT have increased the amount of harm. How
might that matter for the structure of free expression law in this setting?70
First, the harms said to be caused by the distribution of sexually explicit
material and the mechanisms by which the harms occur must be identified. The
standard arguments are that there are two types of harms: an increased risk of
assaults upon women—or those sometimes described as “in the position of
women,” specifically LGBTQI individuals—and a diminution in women’s
social standing and credibility.71 The primary causal mechanism, and the one
on which I focus, is non-cognitive: the unconscious effect that viewing sexually
explicit material has on the viewer.72 Further, some treatments of sexual matters
are unquestionably protected by free expression principles. For example,
discussions of the value of adultery, even when they are presented in ways that
have some non-cognitive components, should be protected by the First
Amendment.73
Consider first the claim about sexual assault that the distribution of the
material in question causes an increased risk of ordinary law-breaking. As I
developed earlier, the increased risk of law-breaking caused by the proliferation
of the material at issue might justify modifying the rule in place if the other
resources for deterring law violation cannot be increased without diminishing
social welfare along constitutionally relevant dimensions.74
There is one wrinkle. The prior analysis of this issue considered the noncognitive features of expression said to cause an increased risk of law-breaking
through its acknowledgment that effective rhetoric might enhance the cognitive
arguments for the targeted action. There the non-cognitive features were
secondary to the cognitive ones. Here they are primary. Still, the prior analysis
suggested the possibility that the rules in place might be altered, or at least
69. For a discussion of the comparative economics of producing sexually explicit material for
videos and the internet, see Cade Metz, “The Porn Business Isn’t Anything Like You Think It Is,”
Wired Magazine, Oct. 15, 2015, available at https://www.wired.com/2015/10/the-porn-businessisnt-anything-like-you-think-it-is/.
70. The proliferation of sexually explicit material might lead us to reconsider the balance of
values the rules in place strike, but I have nothing to add here to the analysis of that proposition
offered in Section III, supra.
71. I include “credibility” in this formulation to capture the idea often describing as the
“silencing” effect of sexually explicit material. That effect is sometimes real but more often
metaphorical—it is not primarily that the distribution of sexually explicitly material causes women
to stop offering their views, though that can occur, but rather that it leads to an undervaluation of
those views’ merits.
72. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 39.
73. The example of course is of D.H. Lawrence’s book, Lady Chatterley’s Lover. D.H.
LAWRENCE, LADY CHATTERLEY’S LOVER (1928).
74. See supra Section IV(C).
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applied differently, as the non-cognitive features of the expression increased
because the required causal connection between the expression and actual law
violation might be weakened. So too here. Perhaps the increased risk of sexual
assault occasioned by an increase in the distribution of sexually explicit material
via NIT could justify weakening either the rule in place or its application.75 But
all this would be triggered only if we thought that the increased risks of sexual
assault rendered other modes of deterring such assaults inadequate.
Now to the claim about the effects of sexually explicit material on women’s
social standing and credibility. Here the causal mechanism is entirely noncognitive. That matters because the usual response to harmful speech—more
speech—is basically unavailable (because the counter speech is typically
understood to be primarily cognitive, with the possibility that effective rhetoric
might somewhat enhance the counter-speech’s effect).
The rule in place can take one of several approaches to primarily noncognitive expression. First, the rule might simply disregard the non-cognitive
causal mechanism. Where it does, increasing the amount of material that works
through such a mechanism would not justify altering the rule in place.
Other approaches end up at the same point. The rule might treat the noncognitive mechanism in the same way it treats the cognitive one. Or, we might
have built non-cognitive features of expression into the rule in place because of
a combination of “family resemblance” and institutional concerns. With two coauthors I have argued that this is how U.S. free expression law deals with what
we call “free speech beyond words”: nonrepresentational art, instrumental
music, and literal nonsense.76 We have one rule for expression that works
through cognitive mechanisms. We apply the same rule to expression whose
effects work through non-cognitive mechanisms but not because there is a
consistent or reasoned principle. We do so because those expressions are
enough like a cognitive expression that decision-makers, especially courts,
would find it difficult to distinguish the two types of speech effectively because
they could not reliably say that in one case, the non-cognitive features were
merely secondary and in another say that they were primary. If we take either
of these approaches, the analysis in Section V(C) kicks in.
Finally, and most distinctive, the rule in place may, or may not, take noncognitive effects fully into account. For example, the rule might be that the
effects upon women’s social standing and credibility do occur but are not
widespread enough to justify some regulation of sexually explicit material in
light of the adverse effect regulation might have on the distribution of
unquestionably protected treatments of sexual matters. The rule in place denies
75. As before, this could occur either by shifting from something like a Brandenburg rule
requiring imminent law-breaking to the kind of balancing called for by a “clear and present danger”
approach, or by adjusting the weight given to the danger within such a balancing approach.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (Black, J., concurring).
76. See generally MARK TUSHNET, ALAN CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH BEYOND
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017).
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the government the power to regulate sexually explicit meat-world photographs
or films. The increased amount of material distributed via NIT might be enough
to push the harm across the threshold. The NIT-responsive rule might expand
the definition of unprotected material, for example, from obscenity to a broader
category of pornography, narrowing the class of protected material and thereby
pushing the amount of harm caused by such material below the threshold.
What if the rule in place already allows regulation of sexually explicit material
because the harm it causes is large enough? Here too, the analysis should be
simple. The more such material is available, the greater the harm. As before,
the rule in place optimizes expression and harm, and so it should be adjusted
when harm increases. As I argued in Section V(C), the adjustment, where the
harm is the risk of law-breaking, ordinarily would take the form of loosening the
degree of a causal connection between expression and law-breaking. That
adjustment is not available here because the non-cognitive effects occur
immediately upon exposure to the material. So, as suggested before, the
adjustment here probably should take the form of expanding the definition of
unprotected sexually explicit material.
E. False Statements That Cause Systemic but Not Material Harm: Herein of
Fake News
The Stolen Valor Act made it unlawful for a person to claim falsely that he or
she had received certain military honors. The U.S. Supreme Court held the Act
unconstitutional in United States v. Alvarez.77 Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion characterized the statute as criminalizing a false statement that caused
no material harm in contrast to statutes criminalizing résumé fraud or, had there
been such a statute, one criminalizing falsely claiming to have received military
honors for the purpose of obtaining leniency in the criminal justice system or
other material benefits.78 Were the government to have the power to do that,
Justice Kennedy argued, it would have the power to criminalize a wide range of
false statements, some of which—such as “social lies”—might have some social
value and others of which caused no harm at all.79
Because the Stolen Valor Act was not a general ban on false statements, the
Court had to explain why the government could not have the power to identify
a specific category of false statements that did not cause material harm but might
cause other harms.80 The government defended the Act in part on the ground
that false claims about military honors undermined the system of military honors
by creating a world in which such honors received less social support.81 Justice

77. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012).
78. Id. at 720–22.
79. Id. at 748–79. Justice Breyer’s opinion concurring in the judgment refers explicitly to
false statements that “can serve useful human objectives.” Id. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 720–22 (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 716.
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Kennedy was skeptical about the claim that there would be such systemic harm
but ultimately accepted its possibility.82 On that assumption, the Court offered
one response and hinted at another. Whatever adverse systemic effect occurred,
the Court said, could be overcome by a form of counter-speech—maintaining an
easily accessible location (a website, specifically) that could be checked to
determine whether a person actually had received the honor she or he claimed.83
Further, the Court suggested that systemic harms, while real, could not be
addressed by the government through regulations that infringed free expression
rights.84 Avoiding systemic harms might not be a permissible government
purpose for free expression purposes.
The Court raised additional concerns. Acknowledging a power in the
government to identify and punish falsehoods raised the specter of a Ministry of
Truth, authorized to identify government-approved truths and disapproved
falsehoods, and (implicitly) we cannot trust legislators to exercise that authority
in a politically neutral way, even if their decisions were subject to judicial
review.85 Other constitutional systems are less skeptical about legislative and
judicial capacity, allowing legislators to outlaw claims that the Holocaust,
appropriately defined, did not occur.86
The Stolen Valor Act decision and the Holocaust lie case are precursors to
today’s concern about fake news. Those concerned about fake news typically
point to systemic rather than material harms—such as undermining the people’s
confidence in public institutions. Those cases also identify some specific forms
of fake news that might be thought to cause material harm. The publication of
false information about where, when, and how to vote by people who know that
information is false is a good example.
Suppose a statement causing systemic but not material harm is made via NIT
rather than via the traditional media. How might the constitutional analysis
differ in light of the larger harm inflicted?
Three considerations count against changing the analysis. If only material
harm counts for free expression law, and systemic harm does not, increasing the
amount of systemic harm should not change anything. Skepticism about
legislative and judicial capacity seems unrelated to the medium through which
expression occurs. If we do not think that the Ministry of Truth can reliably
determine what is true when published in a newspaper, we should not think that
it can do a better job when statements are distributed via NIT. In addition,
82. Id. at 726.
83. Id. at 729.
84. Id. at 725 (requiring a “direct causal link” between the regulated expression and the
occurrence of systemic harm).
85. Id. at 723. This concern would seem to be fully addressed by a requirement that people
could be punished for uttering specific government-identified falsehoods only if the speaker knew
that their statements were false.
86. BVerfGE, 1 BvR 23/94, Apr. 13, 1994, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-lawtranslations/german/case.php?id=621 (the “Auschwitz lie” decision).
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Alvarez might rest on the assumption that, with respect to claims about having
received military honors, the systemic harm not countered by reasonably
available countermeasures was below some threshold. If the increased systemic
harm exceeds that threshold, the rule in place might itself allow the imposition
of liability—and so the rule would not need adjusting when dissemination of
material via NIT also exceeds that threshold.87
That leaves a final consideration that might count in favor of changing the
analysis. To the extent that countermeasures such as the online list of recipients
of military honors matter, the increased systemic harm might make a difference.
New technologies make new modes of response available, of course, as the
online list example shows, but the rate at which systemic harm increases might
outpace the rate at which new technologies make countermeasures available.88
If so, the liability rule might be adjusted to take account of the comparative
ineffectiveness of countermeasures.
Clearly, then, the implications of NIT depend crucially upon what the rules in
place are. The Alvarez decision suggests that the rules in the United States would
not allow a ban on fake news either via traditional media or NIT.89 In contrast,
a law banning the distribution of false information about voting, knowing the
information to be false, might be constitutionally permissible because such
information causes material harm. For example, votes may become actually lost
when voters think that an election is on a Wednesday rather than on a Tuesday.
In contrast, the rules in place that constitutionally permit a ban on the
Holocaust lie rest on two predicates different from those used in U.S. law.90
Systemic harm clearly counts, and there is less skepticism about legislative and
judicial capacity.91 Finally, the fake news issue seems to be almost a paradigm
of a problem where imposing liability for the systemic harm caused by fake news
disseminated via the traditional media might be disproportionate. Conversely,
doing so for material disseminated via NIT would satisfy a proportionality
requirement because of the greater systemic harm.

87. But cf. Massaro & Norton, supra note 1, at 1643 (“Falsehoods that allege widespread
voter fraud . . . corrosive[ly] fuel[] voter cynicism and disengagement.”); Stone, supra note 17, at
47 (“[O]ne might readily argue that widespread lies that are intended to distort public discourse rise
to . . . [a significant] level of harm” akin to the harm associated with “defamation, perjury, and
fraud.”). The analogy here would be to impose liability for making statements that a reasonable
person would understand to be threats of harm. See Section IV(F) infra.
88. I cannot vouch for the following example from my own knowledge, but I have been told
that people creating “deep fakes” and those developing techniques to detect such fakes are in an
arms race that the former are winning.
89. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723. Recall that if Alvarez adopts a threshold requirement to taking
systemic harm into account, and the harm of fake news exceeds that threshold, we do not have to
change the rule to allow regulation of fake news.
90. BVerfGE, 1 BvR 23/94, Apr. 13, 1994, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-lawtranslations/german/case.php?id=621.
91. Id.
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F. Threats: Herein of Material Harm, Distress and Anxiety, and Cyberstalking
Threats cause two kinds of harm. Their targets may experience distress and
anxiety upon receiving the threat, and they may change their behavior based on
a threat by refraining from going out in public as often as before, purchasing a
home security system, and take other precautions.92 Under current doctrine
regulating liability for threats, the government can prohibit “true threats”
delivered in person, by mail, or through NIT. Here, joint optimization takes the
form of defining what counts as a true threat. Importantly, the definition
assumes that people in a complex society have to put up with some unwanted
experiences that cause them distress or anxiety. This principle is embodied in
the idea that the government cannot punish speech if the recipient could reduce
its impact by “merely” averting her eyes.93 Distress or anxiety occurs
immediately upon receiving the distressing material and averting one’s eyes is
thought to cap the amount of distress or anxiety. By this logic, distress or anxiety
below some threshold does not count as harm.
If pressed, courts might recognize that the material harm caused by threats—
changes in behavior—also must cross a threshold. So, for example, changing
one’s voicemail message might not count, but purchasing a home security
system might. More important, implicit in the “avert your eyes” principle is the
thought that some people might venture into the domain of expression only to
withdraw when their interventions elicit responses that offend them. Such
withdrawals are changes in behavior, which I have characterized as material
harm. The “avert your eyes” principle might assume that only a tolerably small
number of people will do so. But, if the number increases because interventions
elicit dramatically more offensive responses, we might conclude that a threshold
has been crossed.
Under current law, a true threat consists of words (or images) that the target
would take to be a real threat—that is, one with some likelihood of actually
being carried out.94 This might be a subjective standard: did the recipient
actually understand the words to be a real threat? It might be objective: would
a reasonable recipient understand the words to be a real threat? A similar mental
state issue arises with respect to the person making the threat: can he be held

92. A low-level example: When I received something that was on the borderline between
hyperbolic criticism and a threat, I changed my telephone voicemail response to eliminate my home
telephone number.
93. Erzoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance
prohibiting the showing of nudity in films at drive-in movie theaters, where the scenes could be
viewed by people not attending the showing: “[m]uch that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not
our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government
to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection
for the unwilling listener or viewer”).
94. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 737–38 (2015).
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liable only if he specifically intends the words to be understood as a real threat?95
Can he be held liable if, with reckless disregard of his words’ effect, he utters
words that the target—or a reasonable person—would take to be a real threat?
Can he be held liable if the target takes the words to be a real threat even if he
did not intend them to be so? Current doctrine is somewhat unsettled on these
questions.96
For present purposes, the question at hand is whether or not to alter the
definition of true threats because of NIT—either for all threats or only for threats
delivered via NIT. Consider first the threshold level of distress and anxiety. At
first glance, this would appear to operate at the individual level. Each of us has
to put up with distress or anxiety below the threshold, as a cost of living in a
“pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of
expression.”97 Yet, if threats proliferate (or get distributed differently), we might
conclude that the aggregate level of distress and anxiety is too high even if no
individual experiences any more distress or anxiety than before. If so, it may be
prudent to lower the threshold that is built into the definition of a true threat.
Next, consider words conveyed via a traditional medium such as a letter or a
television address in which the speaker specifically identifies a target. One
might conclude that those words are not a true threat. However, when conveyed
via some NIT, the same words might be a true threat because the medium affects
the seriousness with which the words are reasonably taken. Note that here, NIT
does not change the rule in place—liability for true threats—but it might change
the application of the rule to identical words.
Threat liability brings to the fore mental state issues that arise in connection
with related activities such as cyberstalking and revenge porn.98 These activities
cause the same harms that threats do, material harm by inducing the target to
change her behavior, distress, and anxiety. Consider first cyberstalking.
Appropriately defined to mean something like lurking in a person’s physical
presence with the intent of causing distress and anxiety, stalking in the so-called
“meat world” can be criminalized or made the basis of civil liability.99 Suppose
95. I should be explicit here. I think that the First Amendment is no barrier to imposing
liability for words that were specifically intended to be a real threat and that would reasonably be
understood as a real threat.
96. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 726 (holding as a matter of statutory interpretation that the federal
threat statute required the government to show that a reasonable person would take the words in
question as a threat); see also State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805, 817 (Kan. 2019), cert. denied, 2020
U.S. LEXIS 3370 (U.S. June 22, 2020) (denying certiorari to the Court, in 2020, to review to a
decision holding that the First Amendment barred the government from imposing threat liability
where the defendant acted with reckless disregard of the words’ impact on the target).
97. Erzoznik, 422 U.S. at 210.
98. See MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION, 45–47 (2019); see also
DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 187–88 (2014).
99. For an overview of the requirements for a conviction for stalking under federal law, see
Deborah C. England, “Federal Stalking and Harassment Laws,” CriminalDefenseLawyer, available
at https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/federal-stalking-and-harassment-laws.htm.
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an individual cyberstalks a victim by sending the victim repeated messages that
cause anxiety and distress above the threshold required for threat liability—even
if the messages are not true threats. It is hard to see why the theory—according
to which liability for true threats is not prohibited by free expression—would
not be applicable to this cyberstalker.100
Now, suppose that cyberstalking is defined to include uncoordinated actions
by individuals, each of whom sends one or two messages that do not cross the
required threshold of distress and anxiety. In the aggregate, these hundreds of
messages do induce the target to change her behavior and inflict more than the
required level of distress and anxiety. At this point, details matter. Is the
proposal to make each participant jointly and severally liable for all of the harm?
For a proportionate share of the harm? Importantly for liability to attach, must
the participant know that others are sending harassing messages; or would
reckless disregard of that possibility be enough? Alternatively, could it be an
unreasonable failure to consider that possibility? The answers to these questions
will determine how much imposing liability will deter people from sending
distasteful but constitutionally protected messages—that is, it will determine the
chilling effect of liability on expression. That, in turn, will affect how many
people withdraw from participating in a public discussion because they are
unwilling to put up with the attendant harassment. Compare an actual
knowledge standard with a reckless one—the former being more difficult to
prove, there will be a smaller chilling effect but a larger number of people
withdrawing from participation. This is once again the joint optimization
question. I defer consideration of these issues to Section VI(C), where they arise
in connection with more realistic proposals to make platforms liable for
distributing the messages that, in the aggregate, are cyberstalking.
This is similar for revenge porn. It is clear that the privacy considerations that
shape the free expression rules in place would allow a state to impose criminal
or civil liability on a person who distributes, hand-to-hand, sexually explicit
photographs taken of another when he knows that the person photographed
agreed to be photographed only on condition that the material would not be
distributed at all.101 Suppose the target can prove only that a reasonable person
who knew the circumstances under which the photograph was taken would have
inferred that she agreed to be photographed only on that same condition.
Further, suppose that the material is distributed (again, hand-to-hand) by
someone other than the photographer. Can liability be imposed for doing so if
a reasonable person seeing the photograph would have inferred that it was taken
with the same restrictive condition on distribution? Here too, the mental element
100. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).
101. The analogy would be to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
The Court limited the scope of IIED liability when the speaker intentionally inflicted emotional
distress in the course of saying something about a matter of public interest. See Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). The holding in this case casts no doubt upon the tort’s purchase in
connection with purely private matters, such as arise in connection with revenge porn.
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question leads one to consider the chilling effect. But note that these questions
arise when considering liability for hand-to-hand distribution. It is not at all
obvious that the answers would be different if the distribution occurred via
NIT—at least when we deal with liability on the photographer or individual
distributor. And again, I defer consideration of the chilling effect issue when
liability is imposed on the platform.
United States v. Stevens might be thought to cast doubt on these conclusions;
here, the Court expressed its unwillingness to identify what it called “new
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”102 The focus,
according to the Court, should be on categories of speech that have been
“historically unprotected.”103 These statements might be taken to weigh against
the constitutionality of laws against revenge porn and cyberstalking, neither of
which, it might be said, were historically unprotected categories.
Yet, the Court acknowledged at least the possibility that there might be some
such categories that “have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as
such in our case law.”104
And it observed that its reluctance to create a new category was tied to the
government’s argument for what the Court called “a simple cost-benefit
analysis.”105 Perhaps other arguments might support creating new categories or,
perhaps better, support a new understanding of the scope of the historically
unprotected categories. The argument that cyberstalking could not have been
historically unprotected because it did not exist in 1791 is, of course, frivolous.
On the other hand, the argument that cyberstalking is sufficiently analogous to
a threat, and thus within a historically recognized unprotected category, is not.
Nor does the analogical argument rely upon a simple cost-benefit analysis.
The structure of that argument is this: true threats were historically unprotected
because they inflicted material harm and caused distress and anxiety, in both
instances above some socially acceptable threshold. Revenge porn and
cyberstalking do the same thing and so fall within the historically recognized
category loosely but inaccurately described as true threats. Whether one finds
the analogy compelling is another matter. Stevens does not rule out the
possibility that the analogical argument is sufficient.
In sum, the First Amendment rules in place regarding threat liability,
especially their mental state components, work just as well for NIT as for
traditional media. Free expression principles should not be a barrier to laws
against revenge porn or cyberstalking. And, if those phenomena are a social

102. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 471. This is an appropriate place to note that constitutional systems relying on
structured proportionality would have no difficulty in doing a cost-benefit analysis and so would
have no difficulty accommodating laws against cyberstalking and revenge porn if, of course, such
laws were thought to conform to the socially acceptable balance between speech and harm.
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problem, then the legal problem is legislative failure to act, not freedom of
expression.
V. REGULATING PLATFORMS
By definition, NIT are new as they distribute material using technologies
different from those used to distribute material via traditional media. This is
especially true when NIT are in private hands as they give rise to seemingly new
business models that are perhaps not merely newspapers on a really large scale.
Or so some advocates for the regulation of Twitter, Facebook, Google, and other
platforms for distributing material argue.
The idea of platform regulation has generated a large amount of literature, and
I address only the narrow question of what the free expression rules in place
have to say about several forms of platform regulation. As throughout this
Essay, the underlying question is whether the platforms’ business models and
operations are such as to require adjustment to the rules in place so that we can
maintain the balance between speech and harm that the rules strike.
I consider three forms of platform regulation: platforms as a form of
government; application of general laws to platforms; and platform liability for
transmitting expressions by others where those expressions are themselves
unprotected by principles of free expression.
A. Platforms as Governments
The Court in Packingham v. North Carolina described “cyberspace” and
“social media” as among “the most important places . . . for the exchange of
views,” in “the modern public square.”106 Similar observations have generated
arguments that platforms, though privately-owned, should be treated as state
actors.107 As such, platforms could not discriminate among users on the basis of
the content the users either posted to the platform or downloaded from it. Nor
could they bar users from posting material that was protected by the
Constitution, though they could choose to allow the dissemination of
unprotected material just as a government can refrain from exercising the
regulatory powers it has.108
Nearly all the Supreme Court’s state-action cases over the past several
decades, including cases invoking the First Amendment, have refused to treat
private parties as state actors.109 For present purposes, all that needs to be said
is that it is not clear why the free expression aspects of NIT, including the

106. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–37 (2017).
107. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 1, at 37 (discussing but rejecting the argument).
108. If platforms allow their use to disseminate unprotected material, they might be liable as
accomplices, a possibility addressed in Section V(C) infra.
109. See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019)
(holding that the operator of a public access channel on a cable television system was not a state
actor).
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business models they enable, should change the state-action doctrine. The
messy and confusing doctrine already has within it the resources to support both
the conclusion that platforms are state actors and the conclusion that they are
not.
B. Platforms and General Laws
Newspaper and television broadcasters have to comply with labor laws,
provide safe workplaces as required by occupational safety and health laws, and
honor their contractual obligations.110 These are, as the Supreme Court has put
it, “generally applicable laws [that] do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability
to gather and report the news.”111 In contrast, laws that single out the media for
regulation either expressly or by gerrymandering seemingly general criteria so
that only the media, or some subset of the media, fall within the regulation’s
scope, have to survive either intermediate or strict scrutiny.112
The first of these principles support the application of other general laws to
NIT platforms. Such laws include antitrust and competition law, fiduciary
law,113 and the law of common carriers. For example, if platforms fit within the
general category of common carriers, they must treat all users equally. This
nondiscrimination principle might produce net neutrality.
The key problem is that the applicable laws must be truly general; they cannot
single out information media or, even more, a shortlist of specific platforms for
regulation. And applying antitrust, fiduciary, or common carrier laws to
platforms might do just that—though it might not if the application requires too
much tinkering with existing law.
To ease exposition, I focus on fiduciary law, though the difficulties can arise
with respect to antitrust and common carrier law. Skeptics suggest that
platforms do not satisfy existing criteria for identifying entities with fiduciary
obligations.114 At first look, treating platforms as fiduciaries would be to treat
them specially, not generally; however, that is not quite right as fiduciary law
evolves incrementally. Presented with arguments that some entity previously
outside the scope of fiduciary law be brought within it, courts ask not only

110. See, e.g., Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301, U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937) (holding that newspapers
must comply with labor laws); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991) (discussing
a newspaper’s contractual obligations).
111. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
112. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star Trib. Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591–93 (1983)
(holding that a use tax imposed on publications that used more than $100,000 per year in ink and
paper a violation of the First Amendment).
113. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 UC
DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2016).
114. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries,
133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 503–04 (2019) (observing that “[a] fiduciary with sharply opposed
loyalties teeters on the edge of contradiction”).
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whether the entity satisfies the existing criteria but also whether those criteria
can be adjusted to make the entity a fiduciary. If conducted within appropriate
bounds, the process applies the general common law method to the question
presented. Or, to modify the quoted statement from the Supreme Court, courts
can apply “generally applicable” legal methods to the media without offending
the First Amendment.
At some point, of course, simply slapping the label “fiduciary” on platforms
does single them out for special treatment. The common law method allows for
incremental development and changes in existing doctrine.115 As Justice
Holmes put it, common law judges “are confined from molar to molecular
motions”116—small adjustments rather than large changes. And the proposition
that the First Amendment does not preclude the application of general laws to
the media but does limit the application of laws that single out the media for
special treatment converts that observation into a statement about constitutional
doctrine. We cannot assess whether the proposed application of antitrust,
fiduciary, or common carrier laws to platforms is molecular rather than molar
without examining the details, few of which proponents of these doctrinal
developments spell out.117
C. Platform Liability for Utterances Not Protected by Free Expression
Most of the advocacy for adjusting the rules in place because of NIT focuses
on the increased harm NIT enable. Platform liability for disseminating
utterances that violate the rules in place could be justified on two grounds.
Platforms enable speakers to inflict harm, becoming at least metaphorically
accomplices in the harmful act. They sometimes enable people to inflict harm
anonymously, making it difficult, if not impossible, to impose liability on the
speaker.118 Platform liability gives platforms an incentive to self-police before
distributing constitutionally unprotected material.
1. Accomplice Liability
Traditional accomplice liability, outside the domain of free expression
domain, arises when several conditions are met. What the accomplice does must
115. See Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501,503
(1948) (describing legal reasoning as a process in which “the classification changes as the
classification is made”).
116. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
117. Although I have quoted Holmes on the limits of common law judging, the
constitutionalized principle would apply to statutes that adjusted fiduciary or antitrust law in mediaspecific ways. Statutes could make incremental changes in fiduciary law with effects on the media,
but large changes with the effect or for the purpose of bringing platforms within the fiduciary
category would have to be justified by applying either an intermediate or a strict standard of review.
118. Even if readily identified, the person actually making the unprotected utterance might be
judgment proof where the preferred remedy is damages, as is typical in libel cases. This is not a
problem distinctive to harm inflicted via NIT though, except insofar as NIT bring out from their
hiding places a larger number of judgment proof offenders.
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aid or encourage the unlawful act.119 And more importantly, the accomplice
must have a specified mental state—usually knowledge, but sometimes less than
that—associated with her action. The usual example is the hardware store
owner who sells rat poison to someone who uses it to kill a romantic rival.
Simply doing so does not make the store owner an accomplice to murder. The
picture changes, though, if the buyer says, “I’m thinking about killing someone.
What’s a good poison to use?” Here the store owner’s knowledge might make
her an accomplice. In another example, a wild-eyed person rushes into the store
and exclaims, “sell me a big knife right away! I really need it!” The customer
then uses the knife to kill someone standing outside the store. The owner might
be an accomplice if she was reckless in selling the knife under the circumstances.
As we will see, different mental elements for liability play a crucial role when
we impose accomplice liability for statements unprotected by substantive free
expression doctrine.
We know that traditional media can be held liable for harms caused by an
expression that originates elsewhere. New York Times v. Sullivan was a libel
case about a paid advertisement, but it was not at issue that the ad’s authors, not
a Times employee, wrote the allegedly libelous words.120 Nor was the theory of
liability predicated on some idea that by publishing the ad, the newspaper had
“adopted” the words as its own.121 The general rule, subject to variation around
the edges, is that a person is liable for republishing someone else’s libelous
statements if the defamed person proves that the republication satisfies the
applicable standards for liability, unless a specific privilege, such as that for fair
reporting of statements made in official proceedings, attaches.122
The same can be said about true threats. Consider a radio talk-show host who
recites over the air a true threat sent him by a listener. The threatening listener
can be held liable for making a true threat, and it is likely that the talk-show host
could be held liable as an accomplice without violating his right to free
expression if the host knew that he was transmitting a true threat and perhaps
even if the host was merely reckless in doing so.
Against the background that traditional media can be held liable as
accomplices when they disseminate at least some types of unprotected speech,
when the dissemination is done with the requisite mental state, does
dissemination via NIT call for a modification of the existing elements of
accomplice liability? On the face of things, it is not clear that those elements
require modification. Professor Wu’s example of accomplice liability—a
president who directs (or perhaps only encourages) his followers to assault a
critic—seems to me to satisfy the mental element requirement for accomplice

119. For an overview of the requirements for accomplice liability, see Sherif Girgis, The Mens
Rea of Accomplice Liability: Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 460, 465-68 (2013).
120. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 265-66 (1964).
121. Id. at 265-66.
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. B & f (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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liability.123 At the least, there need to be more details about how the proposed
accomplice liability would work in specific cases before we can think clearly
about whether the current law of accomplice liability needs to be adjusted to
cover actions by platforms that trouble the platforms’ critics.124
Perhaps, though, accomplice liability pursuant to the rules applicable to
traditional media would deter NIT platforms from disseminating material that
the traditional media would disseminate in the face of those rules.
2. Incentive Effects
How should we think about the incentive effects of platform liability? Here
we have models at hand in regulations adopted in Europe. These regulations
apply to an expression such as true threats and to hate speech that is, in those
nations, constitutionally unprotected.125 Details vary, but the general contours
are these: within a relatively short period after being notified that it has
distributed some forms of unprotected speech—such as hate speech, a libelous
statement, or the Holocaust lie—the platform must take it down by refraining
from distributing it further and excising it from its searchable archives.126
Failing to do so incurs monetary sanctions.127
Platform liability might lead platforms to create systems for identifying
material that might trigger the take down obligation and refuse to disseminate it
in the first place.128 Such systems might use algorithms to identify material that
might generate trouble for the platform and prevent that material from going
onto the platform. And sometimes, the algorithms, or any other system, will
lead the platform to refuse to disseminate material that is in fact constitutionally
protected, such as true factual statements that injure reputation, opinions that
123. See Wu, supra note 1, at 17.
124. Imposing accomplice liability without requiring any mental state—knowledge, specific
or general intent, recklessness—might well violate principles of free expression. I do not know
whether many advocates for accomplice liability for platforms propose that form of liability.
125. American readers must be clear here not to confuse criticism of these legal systems for
failing to provide protection to hate speech with criticism of the incentive effects of platform
liability. It is not a criticism of platform liability that it gives incentives to refuse to distribute hate
speech where such speech is not constitutionally protected.
126. See, e.g., Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken
[Network Enforcement Act] [BGB] [Civil Code], § 3, https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html (Ger.). The Act’s Section 1 (“Scope”) identifies
“unlawful content” by reference to a list of statutory offenses that includes threats (Criminal
Code § 126) and hate speech (Criminal Code § 166 (“revilement of religious faiths”).
127. See id. at §§ 3, 4. The French Constitutional Council invalidated a similar law on
proportionality grounds, emphasizing that its provisions, including an extremely short time period
after notification for taking down proscribed material, gave platforms strong incentives to remove
questionable content. Conseil constitutional [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2020801DC, Jun. 18, 2020, J.O. 156 (Fr.).
128. A platform’s decision to create such a system will depend upon the size of the monetary
liability incurred if it lacks a system (or when material triggering liability is disseminated) and the
cost of creating and operating the system.
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injure reputation, or critical commentary on some factual assertions. This is, as
before, the chilling effect of legal liability.
Suppose that a person can be held liable for distributing unprotected material,
knowing it to be unprotected.129 Even that rule will deter the distribution of
some constitutionally protected material because the decision-maker tasked with
imposing liability might mistakenly conclude that the speaker knew that the
material was unprotected when the speaker, in actuality, did not know that. And
generally, different mental elements will deter the distribution of different
amounts of protected expression.
The rules in place are designed with their chilling effect in mind. That is, the
amount of chilling associated with the rules in place is socially acceptable. The
chilling effect of an actual knowledge standard might be socially acceptable,
depending on circumstances, as might the chilling effect of a recklessness
standard or a negligence one. Is there reason to think that the amount of chilling
associated with platform liability for disseminating unprotected material is
greater than that associated with doing so via the traditional media? Or, more
precisely, is it enough greater than the latter to lead us to reconsider how much
chilling is socially acceptable?130
Design details might matter, at least a bit. For example, does the platform
face liability if it fails to take down materials when notified by an ordinary
citizen, or only when it is notified by some recognized institution, whether
governmental or otherwise? Identifying specific agencies whose notifications
trigger the take-down obligation might reduce the disincentive effects.
Narrowing the class of notifications that trigger the take-down requirement
might do the same. And, to the extent that the agencies providing the notification
have or develop some expertise in identifying unprotected material, the
platform’s uncertainty about whether the material is indeed unprotected is
reduced. And, of course, the length of time before liability is triggered
matters.131
I offer no answers to questions about the chilling effect of platform liability,
no matter how designed. My point is that simply asserting that such liability
will have a chilling effect is not a complete argument against platform liability
129. I find it difficult to imagine a sense in which the material is unprotected if liability could
not attach in the posited example.
130. One set of answers to this question focuses on the rules in place. Suppose platform
liability does increase the chilling effect of enforcing a specific rule in place. We might return the
chilling effect to its prior level by changing the substantive rule by expanding the domain of
protected expression. As before, such substantive responses have to be done on a category-bycategory basis. Adjusted to take account of the proposition that here the response involves
expanding rather than contracting the domain of protected expression, the arguments developed in
Section III carry over here. See supra Section III.
131. Milder versions of liability for failing to take down material after notification can be
devised. For example, liability might be imposed for failing to have in place an effective
mechanism for taking unprotected material down after notification. The analytic issues associated
with chilling effect arguments are the same though.
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because the rules in place for traditional media have a chilling effect as well.
Magnitudes matter.
And, finally, at this point, some basic concerns about constitutional law—not
distinctively about free expression law—kick in. How much deference should
a reviewing court give to a legislature’s judgment that its enactment is
constitutional? More particularly in the present context, how much deference
should the court give to the legislature’s judgment that what it has done satisfies
a constitutional requirement of social acceptability?
Suppose a legislature enacts a statute imposing platform liability after, let us
assume, a full and open discussion of its merits, including the size of the chilling
effect. The enactment itself embodies a judgment by one important social
institution that the size of the chilling effect is socially acceptable. Is it
appropriate for a court assessing the statute’s constitutionality to conclude that
the size of the chilling effect is not socially acceptable? Or, again, more
precisely, what standard of review should such a court apply to the question: is
the chilling effect the legislature has found acceptable actually acceptable? That
is how the most fundamental question about constitutional review arises in this
context, and I have nothing new to add to its discussion.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has explored several lines of argument made in connection with
the claim that the rise of NIT justifies adjusting the existing free expression
doctrine. Its focus has been methodological, seeking to identify precisely how
NIT might affect free expression doctrine without attempting to resolve
normative questions, such as the relevance of material harm to threat liability,
or empirical ones, such as the incremental harm associated with expression
transmitted via NIT that increases the risk of law-breaking.
Yet, if the tenor of most discussions of these questions is that existing doctrine
should be adjusted, the tenor of this Essay is to the contrary. I believe that the
existing free expression doctrine is by and large adequate to deal with the
challenges posed by NIT, especially when we acknowledge that doctrine is never
frozen but allows for incremental change. And, I believe, incremental changes
consistent with existing doctrine—tweaks—are generally enough to deal with
these new challenges.132 The First Amendment, in short, is not obsolete.

132. See also Massaro & Norton, supra note 1, at 1635 (favoring tweaking rather than toppling
existing doctrine).
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